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UNWIRED PLANET v HUAWEI: BIRSS J. UPHELD BY THE COURT OF 
APPEAL  
Abstract  
The Court of Appeal delivered its eagerly awaited judgement in the appeal filed 
against Birss J’s judgement in the Unwired Planet v Huawei case on 23 October 
2018. Birss J’s judgement included the analysis of some of the most controversial 
issues related to standard essential patents (SEP) and particularly the fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) concept. The Court of Appeal 
reviewed these issues and handed down a judgement (together with Birss J’s 
judgement) that has the potential to become a legal foundation for SEP-related 
disputes in England. It is highly likely that these judgements will also provide a 
guidance to courts in other jurisdictions and shape the practice in this highly 
dynamic and developing area. The judgements also represent the English courts’ 
unbiased view towards SEP owners.  
Key words: standards, patents, SEP, FRAND, abuse of dominance, licensing, 
patent valuation  
Introduction  
 Perhaps, Birss J’s in Unwired Planet v Huawei1 is one of the judgements 
that has been discussed most among the intellectual property (IP) community 
since it was delivered on 5 April 2017. The judgement included analysis of the fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) concept in relation to the licensing of 
standard essential patents (SEP) as well as rights and responsibilities of potential 
                                                     
1 Unwired Planet International Limited v Huawei Technologies Co. Limited [2017] EWHC 2988 
(Pat), [2017] RPC 19.  
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licensors and licensees. In this judgement the judge of the Patents Court, Birss J 
considered and applied IP and competition law principles as well.  
 The judgement was appealed and given the importance of Birss J’s 
judgement, the outcome of the appeal had been awaited eagerly. After the appeal 
hearings in May 2018, the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) (CA) dismissed the 
appeal and upheld Birss J’s judgement on all substantive appeal grounds with the 
judgement delivered on 23 October 2018.2  
 This article mainly aims to summarize and comment on the key points of 
the CA’s judgement. For that purpose, the first part will set the background of the 
dispute, the second part will provide a brief summary of Birss J’s judgement while 
the third part will summarize the CA’s judgement under the three sub-headings 
that correspond to the appeal grounds. The fourth part will be regarding the 
author’s comments on the case and the final part will conclude the paper.  
1. Background  
 Before evaluating the CA’s judgement in detail, giving brief factual 
background information about the parties and dispute will help to set the full 
picture.  
 The claimant, Unwired Planet International Limited (Unwired Planet)3 is an 
undertaking which has been active in patent licensing since 2011.4 In 2013 
Unwired Planet acquired – from Ericsson - certain patents including SEPs, which 
constituted the subject matter of Unwired Planet v Huawei dispute.5 After the 
acquisition Unwired Planet approached several undertakings including Samsung 
                                                     
2 Unwired Planet International Limited v Huawei Technologies Co. Limited [2018] EWCA Civ 2344  
3 Also Unwired Planet LLC was involved in the proceedings.  
4 Unwired Planet v Huawei [2017] EWHC 2988 (Pat) (Birss J) (n 1) [60]  
5 ibid [63], [64]  
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and Huawei6 with the p-rospect of obtaining licenses relating to the Ericsson 
patents.7 There appeared to be no dispute that licences were, subject to the 
question of validity, potentially required. During a negotiation period, Unwired 
Planet became convinced that most, if not all, of the potential licensees engaged 
in delaying tactics (i.e. hold out8) and that it would be very difficult to license their 
patents.9 This eventually led to litigation.10  
 In the period 2009-12 Huawei had a license agreement with Ericsson for 
the SEPs subject to the current dispute.11 Before commencing the proceedings 
which ended up before Birss J Unwired Planet approached Huawei.12 They 
exchanged correspondence and certain documents.13 However efficient licensing 
negotiations were, for whatever reason, not possible.  
 In March 2014, Unwired Planet issued patent infringement proceedings 
against Huawei, Samsung and Google in England14 and in the Federal Republic of 
Germany.15 Unwired Planet and Huawei continued the licensing negotiations after 
the proceedings were commenced, and open offers were made by both sides in 
                                                     
6 Huawei Technologies Co. Limited and Huawei Technologies (UK) Co Limited were involved in the 
proceedings.  
7 Unwired Planet v Huawei [2017] EWHC 2988 (Pat) (Birss J) (n 1) [66], [68], [70]  
8 Patent hold out is defined as a reverse patent hold-up. Unlike patent hold up, in patent hold out, 
an implementer (potential licensee) uses a SEP without paying license and engages in delaying 
tactics not to enter into a license agreement. The implementer abuses its bargaining power by 
using the SEP owner’s FRAND undertaking as a leverage.  
9 Unwired Planet v Huawei [2017] EWHC 2988 (Pat) (Birss J) (n 1) [69]; Unwired Planet v Huawei 
[2018] EWCA Civ 2344 (n 2) [221]  
10 ibid  
11 Unwired Planet v Huawei [2017] EWHC 2988 (Pat) (Birss J) (n 1) [61], [71]  
12 ibid [74]  
13 ibid  
14 The main two judgements summarized and discussed in this paper from the courts of England 
and Wales. So their jurisdiction is England and Wales and England will be used instead of England 
and Wales throughout the paper.  
15 Unwired Planet v Huawei [2017] EWHC 2988 (Pat) (Birss J) (n 1) [78]  
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2015 following a direction from Birss J.16 Both parties stated their lack of progress 
in open correspondence in 2016.17  
 The case before the English court concerned six United Kingdom patents, 
five of which were claimed to be SEPs.18 There were five technical trials (i.e. trials 
in which the questions of patent infringement and validity were tested in addition to 
whether those patents were SEPs) and one non-technical trial before the Patents 
Court (a first instance court).19 In the technical trials, two of the patents were found 
to be valid and essential to the relevant standards.20 The non-technical trial, in 
basic terms, focused on the licensing of the SEPs on FRAND terms and whether 
Unwired Planet had, by commencing and perusing litigation or by proposing the 
terms which it did, engaged in anti-competitive conduct.21 The parties in the non-
technical trial were solely Unwired Planet and Huawei, as Unwired Planet had 
settled with Google in 2015 and with Samsung in 2016.22 Following the non-
technical trial, Birss J handed down his judgement on 5 April 2017.  
2. Brief summary of Birss J’S judgement  
 Birss J examined the non-technical aspect of the dispute under three main 
headings of FRAND, competition law and remedies. Perhaps one of the most 
important conclusions that Birss J reached under the heading of FRAND was that 
there is only one FRAND rate for any set of circumstances, taking the opinion of 
the parties’ economic experts into account and also in order to overcome the 
                                                     
16 ibid [79], [81]  
17 ibid [81]  
18 ibid [1]  
19 ibid (n 1) [2]  
20 The relevant standards are 2G-GSM/GPRS, 3G-UMTS and 4G-LTE set by the ETSI; Unwired 
Planet v Huawei [2017] EWHC 2988 (Pat) (Birss J) (n 1) [9]  
21 Unwired Planet v Huawei [2017] EWHC 2988 (Pat) (Birss J) (n 1) [4], [17]  
22 ibid [9], [10]  
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Vringo problem.23 He also examined how the non-discrimination limb of FRAND 
applies and concluded that it should be derived as a principle which is applicable 
to all licensees seeking the same kind of license (i.e. general non-
discrimination).24 Birss J also determined the FRAND terms of the potential 
license agreement between Unwired Planet and Huawei for the SEPs which were 
the subject of the non-technical trial.25  
 In terms of TFEU26 Article 102, Birss J determined the relevant market as 
being the market for licenses of each of the SEPs and concluded that Unwired 
Planet was monopolistic in these markets (and hence, so he concluded, dominant 
in the sense of having market power).27 After considering Huawei’s arguments 
regarding premature litigation (with reference to the Court of Justice of the 
European Union’s (CJEU) Huawei v ZTE judgement28 (ZTE judgement) which 
states, in essence, that litigation and threats of litigation must be a last and final 
resort for SEP owners), unfair excessive pricing, bundling/tying29 SEPs and non-
SEPs and multi-jurisdictional bundling, Birss J decided that Unwired Planet had 
not abused its dominant position.30  
                                                     
23 ibid [147]-[168]: Vringo problem occurs when offers presented by each party are different but 
they are both FRAND.  
24 ibid [177], [495]-[503]  
25 ibid [197], [626]  
26 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union  
27 Unwired Planet v Huawei [2017] EWHC 2988 (Pat) (Birss J) (n 1) [670]; Monopolistic status of 
SEP holders is unique given that they are encumbered with a FRAND undertaking (i.e. they need 
to give a FRAND license to any willing licensee and not complying with that can lead 
consequences like not being able to enforce the patent or request an injunctive relief under certain 
circumstances) so they are not as independent as traditional monopolistic undertakings.  
28 Case C-170/13 [2015] All ER (D) 237 (Jul)  
29 Although Huawei’s claim was regarding the bundling/tying of SEPs and non-SEPs, bundling is 
the appropriate terminology considering that Unwired Planet separated SEPs from non-SEPs upon 
the request of Huawei and they could be licensed separately. Tying refers to situations where a 
seller sells a product (tying product) on the condition that buyers buy another product (tied 
product). Bundling usually refers to the way the products are offered. If more than one product is 
sold as a single package, this is identified as pure bundling. However in case of mixed bundling, 
buyers can buy the bundled products separately as well.  
30 Unwired Planet v Huawei [2017] EWHC 2988 (Pat) (Birss J) (n 1) [671]-[791]  
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 The denouement was that Birss J granted an injunction (i.e. FRAND 
injunction) restraining Huawei from infringing the SEPs which were found to be 
valid and infringed, leaving it open to the parties to agree license terms, should 
they wish to do so.31  
3. CA’S judgement  
 Considering Huawei’s grounds of appeal, the CA focused on the issues of 
(i) whether the offer by Unwired Planet of a global license was FRAND (Birss J 
held that it was), (ii) whether royalty rates set by Birss J were compatible with the 
non-discrimination limb of FRAND and (iii) whether Unwired Planet had abused its 
dominant position.32 Each of these points will be summarized under separate 
headings below, but before doing so, it is worth mentioning the CA’s evaluation 
regarding the FRAND undertaking given by SEP owners to the European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)33 as this had a considerable 
impact on the CA’s reasoning.  
 The CA highlighted that the FRAND undertaking given to ETSI is 
irrevocable and has a global effect of considerable width; so that when an SEP 
owner gave an undertaking to ETSI (or, more generally any SSO) regarding one 
patent, that undertaking would also cover all patents in the same family of patents, 
unless they are explicitly excluded.34 The CA also highlighted that neither a SEP 
owner nor an implementer (usually the name given to the person seeking a SEP 
licence, i.e. licensee) can be compelled to enter into a license agreement, so that 
simply because there is a FRAND undertaking, that undertaking only affects the 
                                                     
31 Unwired Planet International Limited v Huawei Technologies Co. Limited [2017] EWHC 1304 
(Pat), [2017] RPC 919  
32 Unwired Planet v Huawei [2018] EWCA Civ 2344 (n 2) [16], [19]-[21]  
33 ETSI is the standard setting organisation that set the standards subject to the action.  
34 Unwired Planet v Huawei [2018] EWCA Civ 2344 (n 2) [25], [26]  
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ability of the SEP owner to obtain relief for patent infringement.35 Thus if a SEP 
owner refuses to grant a license, despite there being a FRAND undertaking, it 
should be unable to obtain relief for patent infringement.36  
3.1. Whether global license was FRAND  
 Birss J decided that global licensing, which is a common industry practice, 
was FRAND and not inherently anti-competitive.37 He stated that Unwired Planet’s 
patent portfolio subject to the action was sufficiently large and its geographical 
coverage was sufficiently wide, such that it would be inefficient for Unwired Planet 
to negotiate and agree licenses on a country-by-country basis and that because 
handset suppliers were global entities it made sense to have a single licence.38 
However he also mentioned the fact that Unwired Planet’s portfolio was smaller, 
and its coverage more limited when compared to the patent portfolios of larger 
undertakings (e.g. Samsung, Ericsson).39 He proposed to mitigate this by setting 
royalty rates accordingly.40  
 Huawei argued that Birss J’s judgement was inappropriate as it set royalty 
rates and imposed licenses beyond the jurisdiction of the Patents Court. Huawei 
also asserted that Birss J’s reasoning was neither complete nor coherent.41 
Huawei particularly referred to the extant proceedings in which validity was in 
issue against Unwired Planet’s patents (which are SEPs) in the People’s Republic 
                                                     
35 ibid [27]  
36 ibid: Conversely if the implementer refuses to take a FRAND license, then SEP owner could get 
a relief regardless of the prior undertaking. 
37 ibid [34]  
38 Unwired Planet v Huawei [2017] EWHC 2988 (Pat) (Birss J) (n 1) [543]-[544]  
39 Unwired Planet v Huawei [2018] EWCA Civ 2344 (n 2) [37]  
40 ibid  
41 ibid [45], [75]  
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of China and the Federal Republic of Germany, and the relatively small number of 
patents that Unwired Planet has in the People’s Republic of China.42  
 While acknowledging that SEPs have a limited territorial scope, the CA also 
considered the international effect of standards and FRAND undertakings.43 The 
CA mainly followed Birss J’s reasoning focusing on negotiation inefficiencies 
arising from enforcing one of a portfolio of licences on exactly the same terms in 
each jurisdiction separately.44 The CA stated that this approach does not change 
the fact that patents (even when they become SEPs) are protected territorially and 
it does not amount to jurisdictional expansionism on the ground that the approach 
is the natural consequence of the international effect of FRAND undertakings.45 
 The CA also considered the decisions/judgements of the European 
Commission (EC) and courts from other jurisdictions (i.e. the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the United States of America (US), the People’s Republic of China and 
Japan) which the parties referred the court to. The CA concluded that none of 
these decisions/judgements supported Huawei’s argument that licencing on a 
global basis was not FRAND. Despite acknowledging that the EC’s decision in the 
Motorola case supported Huawei’s position, the CA decided that it was not 
sufficient to accept that global license was not FRAND on the ground that the 
Motorola decision did not label all global licenses as not FRAND, it being a matter 
                                                     
42 ibid [33], [85]-[87]: Huawei emphasized on the importance of the People’s Republic of China 
which is their largest market and the place of manufacture. Huawei argued that it should not be 
compelled to pay royalty for Unwired Planet’s Chinese SEPs that had not been infringed, with the 
judgement of an English court.  
43 Text to (n 34) for international effect of FRAND undertaking; Unwired Planet v Huawei [2018] 
EWCA Civ 2344 (n 2) [52]-[54]: In terms of the international effect of FRAND undertakings, the CA 
stated that it is benefit of both implementers whose products traveling to different jurisdictions and 
SEP owners that should be able to prevent free-riders efficiently.  
44 Unwired Planet v Huawei [2018] EWCA Civ 2344 (n 2) [55], [56]  
45 ibid [58]  
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of fact and circumstance.46 The CA also took the views of the EC into account and 
concluded that, even in the case of the EC’s approach in Motorola47 is interpreted 
as meaning that global licenses were not FRAND at all, then the Communication48 
admitted that the EC had changed its view and now took a more flexible and cost-
effective approach for the assessment of whether an offer is FRAND. In support of 
this notion, the CA also stated that Huawei was still free to challenge the validity 
and essentiality of Unwired Planet’s patents in different jurisdictions despite the 
existence of a FRAND license.49 It is unclear what impact there would be if the 
portfolio of licenced patents decreased.  
 In terms of the issue of whether global license was FRAND, the only point 
on which the CA reached a different conclusion than Birss J was whether there 
can be only one set of FRAND terms for any set of circumstances.50 Unlike Birss 
J, the CA found it more realistic, and more in line with mainstream competition law, 
to accept that the notion of what constituted FRAND was not fixed but could vary 
in any given set of circumstances, bearing in mind the complexity of patent 
licensing and the many variables involved in the process.51 Overall the CA 
considered this issue as a theoretical problem given that, in practice any court 
fulfilling the task of determining FRAND terms would determine one set of terms 
                                                     
46 ibid [59]-[60]  
47 Case AT.39985 - Motorola - Enforcement of GPRS Standard Essential Patents Decision 
Judgement C(2014) 2892 final [2014] OJ C 344/6: In this decision the EC decided that the global 
license that Motorola insisted on was not FRAND.  
48 Setting out the EU approach to Standard Essential Patents (Communication) COM(2017) 712 
final  
49 Unwired Planet v Huawei [2018] EWCA Civ 2344 (n 2) [79], [82]: Considering the fact that the 
FRAND license does not prevent Huawei to take patent infringement actions against Unwired 
Planet in other jurisdictions, the CA stated that the ongoing patent infringement actions between 
the parties are not purposeless due to the license.  
50 ibid [121]  
51 ibid  
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or, even if the court determines that the relevant FRAND terms for some sort of 
continuum, the SEP owner would pick something from within that continuum.52  
3.2. Whether royalty rates set by Birss J were non-discriminatory  
 Huawei argued that the license terms set by Birss J were discriminatory as 
the royalty rate was higher than the one agreed between Unwired Planet and 
Samsung.53 Before expressing its view, the CA discussed the application of the 
TFEU Article 102(c) (which determines as abusive the application of dissimilar 
conditions to equivalent transactions by a dominant undertaking), the EC’s 
decision laying down the test to determine comparable transactions54 (EC decision 
72/440/ECSC) and judgements made in different jurisdictions,55 to which the 
parties referred.  
 In order to deal with this ground of appeal, the CA first evaluated whether 
the licenses to Samsung and Huawei were comparable transactions in light of the 
EC decision 72/440/ECSC and then investigated the appropriate interpretation of 
the non-discrimination limb of FRAND.  
                                                     
52 ibid [125]  
53 ibid [132]  
54 Commission Decision amending Decision No 30-53 of 2 May 1953 on practices prohibited by 
Article 60(1) of the Treaty in the common market for coal and steel Commission Decision 
72/440/ECSC [1972] OJ L239/39: ‘Article 3(1) Transactions shall be considered comparable within 
the meaning of Article 60 (1) if (a) they are concluded with purchasers, - who compete with one 
another, or - who produce the same or similar goods, or - who carry out similar functions in 
distribution, (b) they involve the same or similar products, (c) in addition, their other relevant 
commercial features do not essentially differ.’  
55 Unwired Planet v Huawei [2018] EWCA Civ 2344 (n 2) [148]-[157]: OLG Dusseldorf, I-15 U 
66/15 of 30 March 2017 - Sisvel v Haier, US Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit, Ericsson v D-Link, 
773 F.3d 1201 (2014) and US District Court for the District of California, TCL v Ericsson 
(unreported) are three of the judgements evaluated by the CA. In Sisvel v Haier, the court stated 
that even a dominant undertaking can treat undertakings differently as long as it is objectively 
justified. In TCL v Ericsson, the court stated that in order to successfully argue discrimination, the 
claimant must prove the competitive harm as a result of the discrimination. However in Ericsson v 
D-Link, it is stated that even though commercial relationship between licensor and licensee is one 
of the Georgia Pacific factors that the US courts have been using to calculate royalty rates, it is not 
relevant when there is a FRAND undertaking (p 1230).  
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 The CA stated, without justifying why, that while assessing the comparability 
of transactions, the focus should be on the relevant commercial features of the 
relevant transactions rather than the economic circumstances surrounding them.56 
The CA considered some of the factors that Unwired Planet relied on to posit that 
the Samsung license was not a comparable transaction when compared to the 
Huawei license; a powerful factor in this regard was Unwired Planet’s ancillary 
goal of wising to have a strategic partnership with Samsung.57 The CA regarded 
these factors as pre-existing economic circumstances that motivated Unwired 
Planet to enter into a license agreement with Samsung but it ignored those factors 
when assessing whether the Samsung and Huawei licenses were equivalent 
transactions.58 Consequently the CA ignored the powerful factor of aiming to have 
a strategic partnership with Samsung, that affected the terms of the Samsung 
license without providing any concrete justification and concluded that Birss J was 
correct to regard the Samsung and Huawei licenses as comparable as their 
functions as patent licenses were equivalent.59 
 The CA then moved to investigate the non-discrimination component of the 
FRAND undertaking. Huawei argued that non-discrimination requires the payment 
of the same royalty rate by similarly situated firms.60 On the other hand Birss J 
favoured a more flexible approach also considering the potential competition law 
redress mechanisms. He decided that non-discrimination requires the 
determination of a benchmark FRAND royalty rate and the licensor should grant 
                                                     
56 Unwired Planet v Huawei [2018] EWCA Civ 2344 (n 2) [169]  
57 ibid [172]-[175]  
58 ibid [173]  
59 ibid [174]  
60 Unwired Planet v Huawei [2017] EWHC 2988 (Pat) (Birss J) (n 1) [501]-[502]: hard-edged non-
discrimination obligation.  
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licenses on this rate to all licensees seeking the same kind of license.61 Birss J 
stated that this approach still enables licensors to grant licenses on a rate lower 
than the benchmark rate and other potential licensees can demand to get a 
license on this lower rate, if applying different rates to different licensees distorts 
competition (i.e. discriminatory pricing).62 The CA particularly considered non-
discrimination criteria as a tool for implementors to access a technology while 
ensuring that the SEP owner is rewarded fairly for its invention.63 The CA decided 
that the Birss J’s approach strikes the right balance between the interests of SEP 
owners and implementers64 and that the license terms determined by Birss J were 
non-discriminatory.65  
3.3. Abuse of a dominant position  
 Before the CA, Huawei argued that Unwired Planet had abused its 
dominant position by bringing patent infringement proceedings prematurely whilst 
Unwired Planet in the other hand sought to challenge Birss J’s conclusion that it 
held a dominant position in the relevant market.66  
 The CA first dealt with the issue of whether Unwired Planet was in dominant 
position. It was decided that Unwired Planet was in a dominant position in the 
market for mobile telephony patent licences specific to the SEPs in question, even 
though market power was arguably restricted by reason of the FRAND 
undertaking and also the costs associated with hold out.67 The CA particularly 
emphasized the 100% market share of Unwired Planet and stated that this created 
                                                     
61 ibid [503]: general non-discrimination approach.  
62 ibid  
63 Unwired Planet v Huawei [2018] EWCA Civ 2344 (n 2) [194]-[207]  
64 ibid [198]  
65 ibid [207]  
66 ibid [212]  
67 ibid [216]-[218]  
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a strong (but rebuttable) presumption that Unwired Planet was in a dominant 
position, although it is only one of the factors68 used to assess dominance capable 
of abuse.69  
 Then the CA turned to the issue of whether Unwired Planet abused its 
dominant position. For that purpose the CA evaluated the ZTE judgement to find 
the answer to the question whether the CJEU laid down specific mandatory 
conditions which must be satisfied before seeking an injunctive relief or a safe 
harbour.70 According to Huawei’s interpretation of the ZTE judgement, the CJEU 
did lay down specific mandatory conditions; given that Unwired Planet did not 
comply with them, seeking an injunction amounted to be an abuse of a dominant 
position.71 On the other hand Birss J opted for a more flexible interpretation of the 
ZTE judgement; provided that the SEP owner contacts the implementer in terms of 
the patent infringement before initiating any proceedings, non-compliance with the 
other conditions of the ZTE judgement (e.g. alerting the alleged infringer by 
specifying the patent and how it has been infringed, making a specific and written 
FRAND offer to the alleged infringer) will not automatically give rise to abuse of 
dominance.72 Thus the issue of whether there is an abuse should be assessed 
considering the specific circumstances. The ZTE judgement conditions (except the 
one requiring the SEP owner to contact the alleged infringer before commencing a 
proceeding) can be characterised as a safe harbour so if a SEP owner satisfies all 
the conditions, the commencement of proceedings itself will not amount to an 
                                                     
68 See Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty 
to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings Communication 2009/C 45/02 [2009] 
OJ C 45/7 para 12 for the factors that will be taken into account in the assessment of dominance.  
69 Unwired Planet v Huawei [2018] EWCA Civ 2344 (n 2) [225]-[226]  
70 ibid [268]  
71 ibid [251]  
72 ibid [253]-[254] 
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abuse.73 Birss J considered the contact between the parties prior to the 
proceedings as being in compliance with the condition set out in the ZTE 
judgement and decided that Unwired Planet had not abused its dominant position 
by seeking an injunctive relief.74 In the appeal, Huawei contended that Birss J 
misunderstood the ZTE judgement and erred in its interpretation as he did not 
consider it as a whole.75  
 Prior to its evaluation, the CA provided information about the ZTE 
judgement and the behavioural criteria that the CJEU set there - to bring an action 
against an alleged infringer by a SEP owner without infringing TFEU Article 102.76 
For the CA, the main purpose of the judgment was striking the right balance 
between the interests of SEP owners and those of implementers and this view 
was supported with reference to the Communication77, highlighting the importance 
of efficient standardization and SEP licensing environments.78  
 In line with Birss J’s approach, the CA concluded that the behavioural 
criteria set in the ZTE judgement was a safe harbour79 rather than a prescriptive 
set of mandatory conditions and listed their reasons for so holding.80 For instance, 
it was acknowledged that the ZTE judgement required SEP owners to give notice 
to alleged infringers prior to seeking an injunctive relief without infringing TFEU 
                                                     
73 ibid [268]  
74 ibid [258]: Birss J acknowledged that Unwired Planet did not provide the FRAND license terms to 
Huawei before the proceedings. However he decided that Huawei had indeed a sufficient notice 
that Unwired Planet was the owner of the SEPs for which a license might be required, given their 
contact prior to the proceedings. Huawei also knew that Unwired Planet was ready to engage in 
licensing negotiations and license their SEPs to them.  
75 ibid [261]  
76 ibid [234]-[250]  
77 EC SEP Communication (n 48)  
78 Unwired Planet v Huawei [2018] EWCA Civ 2344) (n 2) [266]  
79 ibid [282]: If the SEP owner does not comply with the ZTE judgement conditions, this will not 
automatically amount to abuse of dominance, instead all circumstances must be considered to 
assess whether the conduct is abusive.  
80 ibid [269]-[279]  
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Article 102, but the CA also stated that the CJEU did not provide one single form 
or process for giving that notice, so it is possible that notices given in different 
forms or of a differing scope or indeed in different ways could all satisfy the ZTE 
judgement condition.81 Again it was stated that the safe harbour approach better 
serve the purpose of striking the right balance between the interests of SEP 
owners and implementers than a more cast iron set of rules.82 The CA also 
emphasized on the flexibility of the safe harbour approach and stated that it made 
sense given the different procedural rules of the member states.83 Finally the CA 
pointed out that the current action was taken before the CJEU made its judgement 
in ZTE, so it would be unfair to coerce Unwired Planet to comply with the pre-
action protocol that was identified at a later time.84  
4. Comment  
 The CA recognized that the SEP-related legal framework is still developing 
and consequently took a flexible approach – whether this will be so in the future 
remains to be seen. The CA considered the characteristics of the information and 
communications technologies sector (ICT)85 that the parties were active in and the 
economic effects of standardization. Perhaps this is the main reason why the CA 
highlighted the international effect of standards and FRAND undertaking and 
accepted that a global license could be FRAND on the ground that it would be 
                                                     
81 ibid [271]  
82 ibid [272]  
83 ibid [274]  
84 ibid [275]  
85 Technologies in the ICT sector are, generally, fast changing so patent owners have shorter time 
to recoup their research and development investments compared to other sectors (e.g. 
pharmaceutical sector). Again the ICT products travel from one country to another more, at least as 
personal items.  
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unreasonable to expect a SEP owner to negotiate and enforce its patent rights on 
a country-by-country basis.86  
 Favouring the global FRAND license approach is good news for SEP 
owners. However, it also creates a risk that by compelling implementers – 
especially those who are even slightly risk adverse - to take licenses for SEPs 
which are not valid and/or essential, that there can result in a number of 
inefficiencies not least being the failure to innovate.  
 Any judgement imposing a global SEP license also indirectly enforce 
foreign patents and that contradicts with territorial patent protection and 
enforcement. The CA’s grounds regarding the ability of an implementer to 
challenge the validity of patents which consist of the portfolio, in different 
jurisdictions and the international effect of FRAND undertaking can be seen as a 
theoretical justification of the approach favouring global license. However in 
practice, it is highly likely that the judgement regarding that a global license is 
FRAND will coerce the implementer to get a license for the non-UK/non-EU 
patents that are not prima facie valid and/or essential and the implementer will pay 
royalty for them to avoid an injunction in the UK. Thus it is unclear whether the 
global FRAND license approach serves to the purpose of striking the right balance 
between the interests of SEP owners and implementers, particularly considering 
that getting a judgement regarding the validity or essentiality of a patent in 
different jurisdictions can be lengthy process. There is also a risk that a SEP 
owner can get an injunctive relief against an implementer in another jurisdiction 
through relying on a global FRAND license judgement (which confirms the validity 
                                                     
86 In recent Huawei v Conversant judgement (Huawei Technologies Co. Limited v Conversant 
Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. [2019] EWCA Civ 38, [2018] 1 WLUK 278), the CA reaffirms the global 
FRAND license approach.  
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and essentiality of relevant SEPs) regardless of the validity/essentiality of the 
patent registered in that jurisdiction and prevent the implementer to use the 
patented technology, at least for a while.  
 Availability of compensation claims for implementers or adjusting the royalty 
rates considering the ongoing and genuine invalidation actions are few alternative 
solutions that one can think of. Possibly future judgements will provide a more 
detailed analysis of this complication and a framework for its solution.  
 Perhaps the fact that the courts ignored United Brands87 laying down the 
two-stage test88 for excessive pricing and AKKA/LAA89 reaffirming the same, in the 
assessment of abuse of dominance, despite of a specific excessive pricing claim 
of Huawei, is one of the most controversial aspects of the judgements. Birss J 
determined the FRAND benchmark rates considering the evidence (including the 
economists experts’ statements) submitted by the both sides and then used the 
same benchmarks in evaluation of the excessive pricing claim even though he 
acknowledged that FRAND and excessive price benchmark can be different.90 The 
CA mainly focused on the ZTE judgement when evaluating the excessive pricing 
claim. One can argue that it is relatively difficult to apply the two-stage test to SEP 
royalty rates or the final outcome regarding the excessive pricing claim would not 
be different even the test was applied. However considering United Brands and 
AKKA/LAA was the correct route for assessing excessive pricing, the courts could 
                                                     
87 Case 27/76 United Brands v Commission [1978] 2 CMLR 147  
88 United Brands two-stage test: i. Is the price excessive? and if it is, ii. Is the price unfair in itself or 
when compared to competing products? Whether there is a rational economical explanation for the 
excessive price.  
89 Case C-177/16 Autortiesību un komunicēšanās konsultāciju aģentūra/Latvijas Autoru apvienība 
[2017] (GC, 14 September 2017) 
90 Unwired Planet v Huawei [2017] EWHC 2988 (Pat) (Birss J) (n 1) [757]: Birss J stated accepted 
that excessive price benchmark is higher than FRAND benchmark; FRAND royalty rate would 
always be below excessive price benchmark and continue to be competitive until it reaches 
excessive price benchmark.  
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have an exhaustive excessive price analysis by applying the two-stage test, or, at 
least, they could explain the reason of why it was omitted.  
 Also applying the two-stage test of United Brands could give the CA a 
chance to provide a substantive reasoning for why it did not agree with Birss J’s 
conclusion regarding that there can be only one set of FRAND terms for any set of 
circumstances. Although the CA was right to accept that there can be more than 
one FRAND rate in any given set of circumstances, it did not provide any 
substantial reasoning beyond pointing out the complexity of patent licensing. The 
CA’s conclusion giving the right to choose the license terms to the SEP owner if 
the court determines the continuum of FRAND terms, may also cause some 
controversies as the reason of why the SEP owner makes this choice, was not 
clarified in the judgement.  
 The CA decided that Samsung and Huawei licenses are comparable 
transactions despite that Unwired Planet agreed to license the SEPs to Samsung 
at the lower royalty rate, with the prospect of establishing a strategic partnership 
with Samsung and due to the financial difficulties that it was facing at that time. 
The CA supported this conclusion with making a distinction between the relevant 
commercial features of Samsung and Huawei licenses and the economic 
circumstances surrounding them. Unwired Planet’s aim of having a strategic 
partnership with Samsung and its financial problems were considered as 
economic circumstances and they were disregarded when the compatibility of the 
transactions were assessed. The CA did not provide any substantial reasoning for 
this approach; instead it just referred to the wording of the EC decision 
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72/440/ECSC91 and stated that the economic circumstances can justify the 
difference in treatment of transactions.  
 The CA’s judgement confirmed that not only implementers but also SEP 
owners need protection. In a sense the CA judgment does provide some relief for 
SEP owners, who have been under considerable adverse scrutiny of competition 
authorities in the last twenty or so years when the first Rambus disputes92 arose. 
Rather than only focusing on a patent licence hold up93, the CA acknowledged that 
patent licence hold out94 is also a real risk and, in line with Birss J’s judgement, 
supported the idea that FRAND is only achievable when there is no patent hold up 
or hold out. However it is also fair to point out that the economic analysis of this 
was not rigorous. Experience recalls that in any given SEP licencing situation the 
time periods are comparable to the innovation cycles, in which case the argument 
for encouraging hold out is more compelling.  
 The CA took the notion of the FRAND undertaking as a concept and was 
trying to strike a fair balance between the interests of SEP owners and 
implementers, by ensuring that the former can obtain sufficient return for their 
innovations while the latter can access them on reasonable terms. At this point it is 
worth pointing out the CA’s reference to the ZTE judgement in order to eliminate 
                                                     
91 Unwired Planet v Huawei [2018] EWCA Civ 2344 (n 2) [169]: ‘Commission Decision 72/440 
speaks of the “relevant commercial features” of the transactions, not all the economic 
circumstances prevailing at the time the transaction was entered into.’  
92 There were series of disputes related to Rambus in the US and EU. The main reason of these 
cases was the fact that Rambus did not disclose its potential SEPs while the JEDEC was adopting 
three standards and then tried to enforce their patents against implementers. US Court of Appeals, 
Federal Circuit - Rambus Inc v Infineon Technologies, 318 F.3d 1081, 1096 (2003), US Court of 
Appeals, District of Columbia Cir. - Rambus Inc. v FTC, 522 F.3d 456 (2008), Rambus 
(COMP/38.636) Commission Decision 38636 [2009] OJ C 30/17  
93 Michael A. Lindsay, Robert A. Skitol, ‘New Dimensions to the Patent Holdup Saga’ (2013) 27 
American Bar Association Antitrust 34: Patent hold up can be defined as ‘the ability of the patent 
owner to extract higher royalties (or other more onerous license terms) than the owner could have 
obtained before its patented technology was incorporated into an industry standard’; Unwired 
Planet v Huawei [2017] EWHC 2988 (Pat) (Birss J) (n 1) [92]: Not only extracting higher royalties 
but also declining to grant a SEP license can cause patent hold up.  
94 (n 8) for the definition of hold out.  
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any confusion about the first limb of the FRAND undertaking’s purpose. In terms of 
the problem that the ZTE judgement addressed and the purpose of the framework 
that it laid down, the CA stated that, ‘… the innovators are adequately rewarded 
for the investment that they have made and that they are encouraged to continue 
to invest in research and development and standardisation activities’.95  
 This statement should not be confused with the purpose of FRAND. The CA 
intended that SEP owners ought to be rewarded for their research and 
development investments given that this is the principal (but by no means only) 
function of classic patent protection and, lest it be forgotten, SEPs are 
fundamentally patents. Perhaps what the CA tried to clarify here is that the FRAND 
undertaking should not prejudice the essence of the patent protection unjustly to 
protect implementers.  
 The CA also analysed the nature of the conditions that the CJEU laid down 
in the ZTE judgement in detail to answer the question of whether initiating a patent 
proceeding without complying with all these conditions will automatically lead to 
abuse of dominance. It is highly unlikely that the CA’s interpretation of the ZTE 
judgement conditions, providing a limited guidance, will be widely accepted. This 
proves that the ZTE judgement which is the cornerstone of SEP-related legal 
framework in the EU is still in need of clarification and will be discussed further.  
 Patent valuation is another sensitive issue that was briefly discussed in the 
judgement.96 Birss J stated that, besides the ex ante value97 of the SEP, a proper 
                                                     
95 Unwired Planet v Huawei [2018] EWCA Civ 2344 (n 2) [266] (emphasis added)  
  
96 ibid [83]: The CA did not evaluate the patent valuation issue in detail in the judgement as the 
parties did not challenge this aspect of Birss J judgement.  
97 Value of a patented invention before it is incorporated into a standard.  
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evaluation of value could include the fact that the SEP was just that, a SEP.98 This 
argument was vaunted by the parties’ economic experts.99 As the CA appreciated, 
patent valuation is a complex issue as it is and increasing the number of factors 
that can be taken into account in patent valuation and disrupting the established 
principles may not be the best way to tackle with this complexity. Hopefully future 
judgements will provide more detailed assessments of this issue and present well-
grounded judgments.  
Conclusion  
  SEP-related disputes and determining FRAND royalty rates are challenging 
as they are technical and require legal and economic analysis. They can be also 
tricky considering the court’s limited jurisdiction, territorial patent protection and 
the ICT sector’s realities requiring a quick solution. There are traces of these 
challenges in both Birss J’s and the CA’s judgements and it is clear that there is  
room for improvement.  
 It is particularly important that the English courts take the view that SEP 
owners (and thus, to some extent anyway, the cause of innovation) are entitled to 
some protection. Given this, coupled with the courts’ willingness to decide for a 
global FRAND license, it seems that England is a strong candidate of being a 
preferred forum for SEP owners.  
 Birss J’s and the CA’s judgements dealt with several SEP-related issues yet 
did not give satisfactory answers to all the questions, they are still important for 
English jurisprudence as they provided a medium for discussion. Probably their 
                                                     
98 Unwired Planet v Huawei [2017] EWHC 2988 (Pat) (Birss J) (n 1) [97]  
99 ibid  
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effect will be beyond the boundaries of England and may serve to be of influence 
in other jurisdictions.100  
                                                     
100 Indeed only seven months after it was delivered, the EC considered Birss J’s judgement in the 
EC SEP Communication (n 48) 
